An analysis of david humes theoretical book an inquiry concerning human understanding
These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry.
An enquiry concerning human understanding shmoop
Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal? What logic, what process or argument secures you against this supposition? The brunt of this chapter allegedly narrates the opinions, not of Hume, but of one of Hume's anonymous friends, who again presents them in an imagined speech by the philosopher Epicurus. The mentality of apes. What Does Enquiry Say? Why Does Enquiry Matter? Through his philosophy, Hume attempted to understand something that science had not yet explained: the workings of the human mind. Of the different species of philosophy[ edit ] In the first section of the Enquiry, Hume provides a rough introduction to philosophy as a whole. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind.
Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.
If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand.
Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. The following pages will perhaps show that Hume, in re-casting the Treatise into its new form, displayed the less admirable sides of his temper rather freely.
To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient.
An enquiry concerning human understanding summary
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. This is also, presumably, the "principle" that organizes the connections between ideas. Particularly striking successes have been notched up in machine translation, speech recognition, computer vision, and allied fields. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. Thus the temper of the Treatise is well expressed by his emphatic declaration Bk. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?
They admit not of ambiguity. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning.
Of the idea of necessary connection in two parts [ edit ] Nicolas Malebrancheone of Hume's philosophical opponents By "necessary connection", Hume means the power or force which necessarily ties one idea to another.
An enquiry concerning the principles of morals
How I can not only know but enter into the feelings of another person, when I can only know my own feelings, is indeed a problem worthy of grave consideration. Hume 1. Hume's position is wonderfully simple. The distinction in the Treatise is indeed most bewildering, but, with its disappearance in the Enquiry, the relation of causation becomes more completely subjective, and it becomes even more hard than in the Treatise to see how there can be any difference between real and apparent causes, or any room for concealed causes. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. For Hume, every effect only follows its cause arbitrarily—they are entirely distinct from one another. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct even of persons the most remote, an object of applause and censure. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind.
based on 105 review